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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE SURVIVORS:  STRENGTHENING THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT THEORY 
DENISE R. J. FINLAY 
ABSTRACT 
Domestic violence is a growing problem in the United States, and the 
issues survivors face do not end at home.  This Article argues that the 
disparate impact theory, used in interpreting sex discrimination under Title 
VII, can and should be used to provide protections for survivors of domestic 
violence in the workplace.  In order to achieve this improvement and 
increase the use of the disparate impact theory, a clear interpretation must 
be made.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could 
provide guidance, or the disparate impact theory could be added to the Code 
of Federal Regulations interpreting sex discrimination under Title VII.  This 
Article begins by providing a background for how domestic violence affects 
a survivor’s work experience as well as a background of sex discrimination 
theories under Title VII in Parts II and III respectively.  Part IV addresses 
how to use the disparate impact theory to protect working domestic 
violence survivors, and Part V introduces my proposal to change Title VII’s 
interpretation.  Part VI applies Title VII to women employees who are also 
survivors by outlining limitations of Title VII and offering a comparison to 
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.  Finally, Part VII outlines how 
the changes I have suggested may be implemented to improve use of 
disparate impact theory to protect survivors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One in three women experience physical violence by an intimate 
partner, and nearly one in ten women are raped by an intimate partner in her 
lifetime.1  Domestic violence and sexual assault significantly affect women 
in the United States.2  In 2012, in North Dakota, 4,624 new victims received 
services from crisis centers across the state, and ninety-four percent of these 
victims were women.3  Domestic violence is “a pattern of behavior in which 
one intimate partner uses physical violence and/or sexual or economic 
abuse to control the other partner in the relationship.”4  Domestic violence 
 
1. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY, 39 (2010) [hereinafter CDC SURVEY].  It is recognized that men are 
also survivors of domestic violence, but this Article will focus on women due to the 
disproportionate number of women who are victimized.  See id. 
2. The same survey reported that about one in ten men in the United States have experienced 
rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner.  Id. 
3. Facts About Domestic Violence in North Dakota, N.D. COUNCIL ON ABUSED WOMEN’S 
SERVS., http://www ndcaws.org/facts/domestic_violence/domestic_violence_stats html (last 
visited April 25, 2013) (finding at least seventy-five percent of victims served were physically 
abused and weapons were used in at least eleven percent of the cases identified). 
4. JULIE GOLDSCHIED & ROBIN RUNGE, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 2 (2009). 
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is not solely defined by physical abuse, but also by patterns of behavior that 
could include threats, intimidation, and other controlling acts.5 
Domestic violence exists in the workplace and can take many forms.  
Approximately, two-thirds of employed survivors6 reported her abuser 
harassed her at work,7 and up to half of those women also reported she lost 
a job due at least in part due to domestic violence.8  Over half of employed 
survivors also reported they missed work because of the abuse, and forty-
seven percent stated they were directly prevented from going to work by 
their abuser.9  Maintaining employment is crucial to a survivor of domestic 
violence.  If she is trying to escape the violence, she will need income to 
afford relocation.  She may also need regular income to pay for medical 
expenses.  She may need to go to court to testify against her abuser who has 
been charged, or to obtain a protection order for her safety.  Some women 
may be fired simply because the employer learns she is a survivor of 
domestic violence and fears “the potential drama” that domestic violence 
may bring to the workplace.10  This example would constitute employment 
discrimination under Title VII.11  The disparate impact theory is an 
employment discrimination doctrine used for members of a protected class 
to assert a claim of discrimination, based on a facially neutral policy that 
adversely affects the class as a whole.12  This Article will examine how the 
disparate impact theory in sex discrimination should be used to protect 
domestic violence survivors from discrimination in the workplace. 
 
5. Id. 
6. The author uses the term “survivor” to describe women who have experienced or are 
currently experiencing domestic violence as opposed to “victim.”  While working as a crisis-line 
advocate in North Dakota, the author learned in her training that “survivor” is a term preferred by 
most women who have experienced violence or are enduring violence in their lives, as well as the 
advocates, counselors, and volunteers who work with them.  The term “victim” is only used in this 
paper where it is taken directly from another cited article or statutory text. 
7. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
8. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 7-9 (1998), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/archive/1999/he99012.pdf. 
9. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 4 (citing Judith McFarlane et al., Indicators of 
Intimate Partner Violence in Women’s Employment, 48 AM. ASSOC. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
NURSES J. 217 (2000)). 
10. Questions and Answers:  The Application of Title VII and the ADA to Applicants or 
Employees Who Experience Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault or Stalking, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_domestic_violence.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
11. Id. 
12. See infra note 73. 
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II. TITLE VII:  PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1964 and amended in 
1991 to prohibit discrimination in employment against protected classes: 
race, national origin, color, sex, and religion.13  Because of the 
disproportionate number of women who are survivors of domestic violence, 
discrimination against a survivor of domestic violence in the workplace 
constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.14  Terminating a woman 
because she is a victim of domestic violence is, in essence, terminating her 
because of her sex. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC, which is 
charged with enforcing federal employment discrimination laws.  The 
congressional purpose of Title VII is to provide equal employment 
opportunities.15  Considering the impact that domestic violence has on 
women’s lives, specifically in the workplace, preventing discrimination 
against survivors of domestic violence seems to support the Congressional 
goals of Title VII.16  Why is it that this goal has not been met and survivors 
of domestic violence are not being protected from discrimination in the 
workplace?  The answer is arguably because the disparate impact theory, 
the most applicable legal theory to employment discrimination against 
domestic violence survivors, is not thoroughly developed in case law or 
supporting federal regulations.  Fifty-two percent of women survivors are 
terminated for reasons attributable in some way to domestic abuse.17  The 
larger pattern of inferior treatment and sex discrimination is obvious.  
Congress clearly intended to protect survivors of domestic violence under 
Title VII, even if it is not facially apparent in the statute.18 
In 1979, Congress adopted federal regulations interpreting Title VII, 
which were to provide guidance regarding the implementation of Title VII 
and are found in the Code of Federal Regulations (“the regulations”).19  
 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
14. See id.; Julie Goldschied, Domestic Violence as a Form of Discrimination, in THE 
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 389, 391 (2d ed. 2004). 
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a) (2012). 
16. Id. § 1608.1(b). 
17. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 19. 
18. This intent was recently made more apparent in October 2012, when the EEOC published 
a fact sheet on their website outlining how Title VII applies to employees who have experienced 
domestic violence or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, complete with examples.  EEOC, 
supra note 10. 
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a). 
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These regulations are subject to amendment through proposed rules.20  The 
EEOC21 also uses guidelines to interpret theories of workplace 
discrimination.22  Courts, lawyers, and administrative agencies use the 
guidelines in order to locate appropriate legal doctrines, and the regulations 
clarify the application of law to fact as well.  Federal regulations are 
regularly cited by courts but are persuasive authority and not binding.23  
Many causes of action under Title VII are described by these regulations 
and guidelines, and these may be used to protect survivors of domestic 
violence in the workplace.24  Unfortunately, sexual harassment is the only 
form of sex discrimination described by the regulations used to interpret 
Title VII.  Additionally, the disparate impact theory is not mentioned.  In 
order for Title VII to effectively protect domestic violence survivors from 
discrimination in the workplace, regulations and guidelines interpreting the 
disparate impact theory should be added. 
The subsections that follow will outline sexual harassment, disparate 
treatment, and disparate impact analyses and explain whether they apply to 
the scenarios described in Part III: when the abuser and survivor work 
together, when the abuser is harassing the survivor at her workplace (in 
person or through other means), or when the abuse has an indirect impact 
on the survivor’s workplace. 
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
In restricted circumstances, a domestic violence survivor may seek 
recourse through a claim of sexual harassment.25  This limited theory 
provides an opportunity for women who are attacked by third parties.26  In 
 
20. See, e.g., Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 
Fed. Reg. 70, 921 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
21. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with enforcement of Title VII; see 29 C.F.R. 
§1608.1. 
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a). 
23. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 
478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986). 
24. See Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle:  Title VII, Domestic Violence, and 
Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 177-90 (2003) (describing theories of sex 
discrimination). 
25. EEOC, supra note 10. 
26. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States Supreme Court first recognized 
sexual harassment as a prohibited form of sex discrimination in the workplace. 106 S. Ct. 2399, 
2411 (1996).  In this case, Ms. Vinson brought action against her supervisor and the bank that she 
worked for, claiming that sexual advances by her supervisor created a hostile work environment.  
Id. at 2402. Sexual harassment claims are divided into two types:  quid pro quo harassment and 
hostile work environment.  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2012).  The details of these theories are 
complicated and beyond the scope of this article.  See Calaf, supra note 24, at 177; see also 
Kristen L. Mix, A Sexual Harassment Primer, 29 COLO. LAW 33, 34 (Oct. 2000).  See generally B. 
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some instances, this third party could be the woman’s intimate partner who 
is also a co-worker or supervisor.  In other cases, sexual harassment could 
occur where an employee’s supervisor learns she has recently been subject 
to abuse, sees her as vulnerable, and when he makes sexual advances, she 
refuses and he terminates her employment.27 
The North Dakota Human Rights Act (ND Human Rights Act) 
prohibits sex discrimination, among other protected classes.28  In North 
Dakota, a survivor of domestic violence who meets jurisdictional 
requirements would file her action for sex discrimination against her 
employer with the North Dakota Department of Labor, Human Rights 
Division.29  The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated, when interpreting 
the ND Human Rights Act, they will look to federal interpretations of Title 
VII for guidance.30  This court also concluded that sexual harassment is an 
actionable form of sex discrimination under the ND Human Rights Act.31  
In this case, a male employee claimed his female supervisor sexually 
harassed him, as defined under the ND Human Rights Act, when she 
purportedly sent him cards, notes, and e-mails of a sexual nature, discussed 
sexual topics at work, bumped into him in the office, and once rubbed his 
back.32  While the court found Opp did not have an actionable sexual 
harassment claim,33 they did conclude that sexual harassment constituted 
sex discrimination under the ND Human Rights Act.34 
Sexual harassment theories do act to protect domestic violence victims 
who are being harassed or assaulted by the abuser, who are also co-workers 
or supervisors at work, but it does not protect the survivor in situations 
where abuse is not taking place at work.35  The sexual harassment theory 
 
Glenn George, Theory & Practice: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 727, 728 (2007). 
27. EEOC, supra note 10. 
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009).  The North Dakota Human Rights Act, codified 
in Title 14 of the North Dakota Century Code, covers discrimination in the areas of employment, 
public accommodations, housing, state and local government services, and credit transactions. 
29. The EEOC works with Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) to manage charges 
of discrimination.  The North Dakota Department of Labor was designated as a FEPA in 1987.  
See Discrimination in Employment, ND.GOV, http://www nd.gov/labor/humanrights/employ 
ment html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). 
30. Opp v. One Source Mgmt., Inc., 1999 ND 52, ¶ 12, 591 N.W.2d 101, 105.  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court addressed sexual harassment for the first time in this case.  Id. 
31. Id. ¶ 13, 591 N.W.2d at 106. 
32. Id. ¶ 5, 591 N.W.2d at 104. 
33. Id. ¶ 16, 591 N.W.2d at 107. 
34. Id. ¶ 14, 591 N.W.2d at 106. 
35. While further discussion of sexual harassment theories is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is important to note that employers have been found liable under Title VII for cases where a 
female employee is harassed by customers of a business and the employer fails to take action to 
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does not apply to any of the three factual scenarios in Part III of this Article.  
As of this writing, the sexual harassment theory has not been applied in a 
factual scenario involving a survivor of domestic violence in North Dakota. 
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT 
With regard to domestic violence survivors, disparate treatment would 
apply only when an employer intentionally treats a survivor of domestic 
violence different from other employees.  This happens, for example, when 
a survivor is fired while her abuser is retained.36  In order for a plaintiff to 
succeed under this theory, she must first be able to prove the employer 
intended to treat her differently from a male in a similar situation.37  This is 
a difficult and high burden to meet, as it falls squarely under the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting model.38  Additionally, the disparate treatment 
theory is only applicable to a limited number of domestic violence 
survivors.39  The two instances in which this theory may apply are:  (1) 
situations where battered women seek a privilege extended to their male co-
workers; or (2) where the same corporation employs both intimate partners 
and treats them differently upon learning about their abusive relationship.40  
Even if a domestic violence survivor is successful in proving a case for 
disparate treatment, the employer has a strong defense in justifying sex 
discrimination if they have a “bona fide occupational qualification.”41  This 
means if the employer can prove that he or she acted out of necessity to the 
business, it is a full defense.42  A common justification used by employers 
is the employee would have been fired anyway, and the abuse at work was 
simply the “straw that broke the camel’s back.”43 
 
protect them.  See, e.g., Lockhard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(employer may be held liable for harassing conduct of its customers). 
36. See supra Part III.A. 
37. Id. 
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the 
burden-shifting model used to analyze disparate treatment cases).  Under the burden-shifting 
model, the complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden of establishing their prima 
facie case of discrimination.  Id.  The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her adverse employment action.  Id. 
39. Calaf, supra note 24, at 182. 
40. Id. at 183 (referring to Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir. 
1981) and RAP, Inc. v. D.C. Comm’n on Rights, 485 A.2d 173, 178 (D.C. 1984)). 
41. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).  
42. Id. 
43. Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 323 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Fisher v. 
Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 655 (1st Cir. 1979), Whiteside v. Gill, 580 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1978).  In 
Rohde, K.O. executives testified that the incident between Linda and her abuser was “the straw 
that broke the camel’s back” and “the crowning blow” that caused a termination that was bound to 
happen eventually.  Rohde, 649 F.2d at 323. 
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The disparate treatment theory has been successfully used in litigation.  
For example, in Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc.,44 Linda Rohde was 
successful in her Title VII claim where she experienced an altercation with 
her co-worker boyfriend.45  First, Linda was able to prove she was treated 
different when she was fired and her abuser was retained.46  Second, 
Linda’s employer was unable to meet the burden of proving that Rohde 
would have been fired anyway, absent the discrimination as required by the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting model.47  Because of this, the burden 
did not shift back to Linda, and the court found her case was strong enough 
to undermine her employer’s justification for firing her.48 
While North Dakota courts have not addressed a factual scenario 
involving disparate treatment of a domestic violence survivor, disparate 
treatment sex discrimination in employment has been litigated.  Following 
federal precedent, North Dakota courts have held disparate treatment sex 
discrimination has occurred when:  (1) the plaintiff is a member of a 
protected class; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; (3) 
the plaintiff’s work performance was satisfactory to the employer; and (4) 
the plaintiff can show that they were treated adversely because of their 
protected status.49  After this prima facie case has been met, the burden 
would shift to the employer to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employment action.50 
In order for a survivor of domestic violence to apply the disparate 
treatment theory, the survivor must be working with her batterer and 
intentionally treated differently than her batterer when an adverse 
employment action is taken against her.51  The disparate treatment theory 
only reaches one of the three scenarios discussed in Part III of this Article.52  
Because the disparate treatment theory has a limited reach for survivors of 
 
44. 649 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1981). 




49. Miller v. Medcenter One, 1997 ND 231, ¶ 13, 571 N.W.2d 358, 361; see also 
Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass’n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 1995) (discussing the 
prima facie elements of intentional discrimination); Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 
N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993). 
50. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 227 (analyzing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
model under North Dakota law). 
51. Miller, ¶ 13, 571 N.W.2d at 361. 
52. Referring to situations where the batterer and the survivor work together and the abuse 
takes place in the workplace, leading the employer to take action against the female victim and not 
the male batterer employee. 
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domestic violence, the disparate treatment impact theory is essential to 
ensure fair treatment of women in the workplace, as Title VII mandates. 
C. DISPARATE IMPACT 
The final theory that should apply to survivors of domestic violence, 
and the focus of this paper, is the disparate impact theory.  Disparate impact 
occurs when an employer has a facially neutral policy or takes an adverse 
employment action against a member of a protected class, and that action 
impacts the class as a whole.53  Disparate impact does not require a survivor 
of domestic violence to prove her employer acted with discriminatory 
intent.54  “Instead, she can bring a claim by demonstrating that a specific 
employment practice or policy induces a statistically significant disparity 
between female and male employees and that a causal relationship exists 
between the employment practice in question and the resulting disparity.”55  
This theory is essential for domestic violence survivors because it covers 
more factual scenarios than sexual harassment or disparate treatment, as 
will be shown through factual scenarios laid out in Part III. 
As of this writing, there has been no application of the disparate impact 
theory to sex discrimination law in North Dakota.  This does not mean it 
cannot be applied.  Hypothetically, if a survivor who lived in North Dakota 
was fired because she missed work due to her fear that her abusive partner 
would find her there,56 she could apply the disparate impact theory under 
the ND Human Rights Act because the ND Human Rights Act prohibits sex 
discrimination in employment.57  The survivor would need to prove she is a 
member of a protected class, and her employer’s practice of firing her had a 
statistically significant impact on her class as a whole.  The first element is 
met because she is a woman.  The second element is proven by:  (1) citing 
statistics that show domestic violence survivors are disproportionately 
women; and (2) that she was fired because of her status as a domestic 
violence survivor.58  A full discussion of how this theory can help domestic 
violence survivors follows in Part IV. 
 
53. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
54. Calaf, supra note 24, at 176. 
55. Id. at 186-87 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989) 
(explaining the requirement that an employment practice caused a statistical disparity)). 
56. See Part II.C. 
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009). 
58. See infra note 85 (case citing the elements required to prove disparate impact). 
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III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE WORKPLACE 
If a victim of domestic violence is employed, that violence may affect 
her work.  It is common for employed domestic violence survivors to be 
fired by employers due to “absences, workplace disruptions, performance 
problems—or simple prejudice against victims.”59  Between twenty-four 
and fifty-two percent of domestic violence victims in three studies reported 
they lost a job due, at least in part, to domestic violence.60  A survivor who 
is terminated or treated adversely by her employer due to the impact of 
domestic violence or sexual assault may have a cause of action under the 
disparate impact theory in employment discrimination law.61  These 
negative job consequences of domestic violence have a disproportionate 
impact on female employees because the vast majority of victims of 
domestic violence are women.62  There are three distinct ways that domestic 
violence can impact a survivor’s employment:  (1) when the batterer and the 
survivor work together, the abuse takes place in the workplace, leading the 
employer to take action against the female victim and not the male batterer 
employee; (2) when the perpetrator of the domestic violence harasses and 
stalks the survivor at work, and that negatively impacts her work 
performance and causes a perceived safety risk to the workplace, and the 
employer fires the female survivor of domestic violence as a result; and (3) 
when there is no direct contact by the perpetrator with the employed 
survivor’s workplace, but the abuse she is experiencing at home 
detrimentally impacts her ability to get to work and maintain her work 
performance and she is fired.63  These impacts can manifest in many 
different factual scenarios.  The following true vignettes demonstrate the 
impact domestic violence has on survivors in the workplace. 
 
59. See Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State 
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 677 (2008).  
60. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 19. 
61. Julie Goldscheid, Disparate Impact’s Impact:  The Gender Violence Lens, 90 OR. L. 
REV. 33, 34 (2011). 
62. CDC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 39. 
63. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?:  Is Termination the Solution 
When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 293-97 (2006) 
(describing disparate treatment, disparate impact, and sexual harassment theories and how they 
apply to scenarios involving female victims of domestic violence).  Being fired is only one 
example of an adverse employment action that could result from any of the three listed ways that 
domestic violence can impact a survivor’s employment. 
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A. WORKING WITH THE ABUSIVE PARTNER 
Kim (pseudonym) and her husband worked for the same large 
computer company.64  Kim’s husband physically assaulted her both at home 
and at work.65  She reported the abuse to a supervisor, obtained a restraining 
order against her husband, which included the workplace, and hoped her 
employer would enforce it.66  After a few weeks, Kim’s husband assaulted 
her at work again, so she called the police and he was arrested.67  Kim 
thought her employer would take disciplinary action against her husband, 
but after two days nothing was done.  Instead, Kim was terminated for 
“crying in the lobby,” and her husband was able to retain his job.68 
Situations like this are all too common and effectively re-victimize the 
survivor.69  In this scenario, the discriminatory act takes place when the 
employer becomes “fed up” with the survivor’s “outbursts” at work, and 
apparent inability to complete her job-related tasks; the employer takes 
action and fires her, while retaining her abuser.  This is sex discrimination 
as defined under Title VII because the employment action is effectively 
treating women differently from men.70  The employer is victimizing the 
survivor by firing her, and allowing her abuser, the cause of her outbursts 
and inability to function in the workplace, to remain employed. 
B. WHEN THE ABUSIVE PARTNER IS NOT A CO-WORKER 
In many cases a survivor of domestic violence does not work with her 
abuser, but the effects of the violence she is facing at home carry into the 
workplace.  Cindy (pseudonym) lives with her boyfriend, and one night at 
home he rapes her.71  Cindy finds she is experiencing trauma-related 
anxiety attacks and begins seeing a rape counselor.72  Her rapist begins to 
stalk her at work through harassing phone calls; he is angry because she 
 
64. Id. at 276 (citing ROBIN R. RUNGE & MARCELLENE E. HEARN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 






69. Porter, supra note 63, at 280.  
70. See, e.g., Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding 
female employee established a prima facie case for employment discrimination under Title VII 
when she was terminated after an altercation with a male coworker with whom she had a 
relationship, while the male coworker was retained). 
71. Robin R. Runge, Employment Rights of Sexual Assault Victims, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 299, 299 (2006). 
72. Id. 
            
1000 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:989 
reported the rape and agreed to assist in the prosecution.73  She does not 
want to tell her employer about what happened because she is embarrassed, 
but her anxiety attacks and his phone calls are causing her to breakdown at 
work, affecting her ability to do her job.74  More than anything, Cindy 
probably wanted to remain safe at work and keep her job.75  Instead, if she 
tells her employer that she is a domestic violence survivor, she may have 
her hours cut back, be overlooked for promotions, or even terminated.76 
C. INDIRECT IMPACT ON THE SURVIVOR’S EMPLOYMENT 
Mary (pseudonym) had a job as a counselor for people living with 
autism and she loved it.77  She did not work with her partner.  She was 
unhappy in her relationship, and when she attempted to end it, her partner 
beat her so badly she was hospitalized.78 
A year after the breakup, Mary’s ex-partner repeatedly threatened to 
kill her, harassed her, and stalked her while she pursued prosecution for the 
assault.  Terrified, she obtained a civil protection order against her ex-
partner and had it renewed several times.  As a result of this continual 
harassment, Mary often had difficulty sleeping at night, anxiety-ridden and 
fearful of how her ex-partner might harm her.79 
Throughout the process of obtaining judicial restraining orders and 
attending domestic violence counseling sessions, Mary missed four days of 
work.80  One weekend, Mary’s ex-partner showed up at her home with a 
gun and threatened to kill her.  Mary fled to a friend’s house in another city, 
and on Monday, when she was leaving her friend’s house to go to work, she 
saw her ex-partner waiting for her outside.81  Afraid of another attack, Mary 
called the police and missed work that day.82  “Her employer fired her two 
days later, citing her poor attendance record.”83  Mary’s story depicts the 
manifestation of domestic violence in the workplace only through the 





76. See id. 
77. Robin R. Runge, Double Jeopardy:  Victims of Domestic Violence Face Twice the Abuse, 
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IV. USING THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY TO PROTECT 
WORKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 
Facially neutral employment policies or actions can have a “disparate 
impact” on an employee that is a member of a class protected by Title VII.84  
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,85 the United States Supreme Court provided 
guidance on how a plaintiff is to prove discrimination under the disparate 
impact theory.  In Griggs, a class of African-American employees brought 
suit against their employer because they were required to have obtained a 
high school education or pass a standardized general intelligence test as a 
condition of employment or to transfer jobs, where neither related to job 
performance.  In cases like this where disparate impact is alleged, the 
plaintiff employees need to prove:  (1) they are a member of a protected 
class under Title VII; and (2) the employer’s neutral policy or practice has 
an adverse impact on the class as a whole.86  Statistical evidence is often 
required to prove the second part of a disparate impact claim.87  For 
example, in Griggs, the employees proved the employer’s policy of 
requiring a high school diploma for higher paid jobs had an adverse impact 
on African-Americans because they were disproportionately less educated 
than white employees, due to long-standing inferior educations received in 
segregated schools.88  Similarly, using existing statistical evidence that 
shows domestic violence survivors are primarily women can be used to 
support the disparate impact theory in employment discrimination. 
Being terminated for missing work to heal from injuries inflicted by an 
abuser is one example of how a survivor of abuse may lose her job due to 
domestic violence.  At first glance, this action may seem like an employer is 
simply exercising the legal right to terminate an at-will employee.  
However, it can be persuasively argued that an employer is discriminating 
against the female employee when the employer systemically fires the 
employee because of her status as a survivor.  In general, it is legal for an 
employer to fire an at-will employee who is a woman, for missing too much 
work or for poor job performance.  However, the employer violates Title 
VII when the employer takes adverse action, (i.e., termination), against a 
woman because of her status as a survivor of domestic violence. 
 
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
86. See, e.g., id. at 429-30. 
87. Id. at 430. 
88. Id. 
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The disparate impact theory is less frequently used in employment 
discrimination law than some suggest it should be.89  Critics state the theory 
was a mistake in the first place and ask why changes need to be made at 
all.90  For example, Michael Selmi, a harsh critic of the disparate impact 
theory, asserts it is more difficult to prove than intentional discrimination, 
because the business necessity part of the test is difficult to satisfy.91  
Without being able to prove your employer’s action is not necessary for his 
or her business, the court’s decision on this is entirely subjective, leaving 
the court able to make “normative judgments regarding the merits of the 
challenged practice.”92  While it is true that courts may be reluctant to 
classify an action as discriminatory, I would argue it is even less likely for 
courts to find intentional discrimination.  By creating a place in the 
regulations to explain the discriminatory effect that unintentional acts are 
having, employers may have the opportunity to correct behavior that has 
been hurting a protected class of people.  The fact that employers have an 
easy time satisfying the burden of proving a business necessity should not 
preclude a plaintiff from challenging a discriminatory practice. 
As with the discriminatory effect standard proposed under the FHA, 
Title VII could easily outline the required business necessity burden.  I 
agree with Selmi when he states, absent a “smoking gun” convincing courts 
that discrimination exists may be difficult for the plaintiff, let alone trying 
to draw an inference from a seemingly neutral act.93  However, I disagree 
with Selmi that this is reason enough to give up on disparate impact, 
classify it as a mistake, and try to expand the definition of intent instead.94 
Expanding the definition of intentional discrimination will not protect 
domestic violence survivors in the workplace because it will not address the 
impact that unintentional discrimination has on these women.  Because the 
vast majority of domestic violence survivors are women, discriminating 
against a domestic violence survivor is sex discrimination.95  Most 
employers are not likely intentionally discriminating against women, but 
the end result is the same.  I would argue the best way to protect these 
women is to clarify and strengthen the discriminatory effects standard for 
finding sex discrimination under Title VII. 
 
89. Id.; Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:  Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 
WM. & MARY L. Rev. 911, 985-88 (2005) (arguing for the revival of the disparate impact theory). 
90. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
753-55 (2006). 
91. Id. at 706, 769. 
92. Id. at 769. 
93. Id. at 768. 
94. Id. 
95. CDC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 39. 
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Domestic violence is a nationwide problem.96  If this nation wants to 
move toward ending violence against women, the discriminatory acts that 
victimize survivors of domestic violence need to stop.  Wrongfully 
terminating a woman, who is a survivor of domestic violence, could prevent 
her from fleeing her abuser, the very thing that society is constantly 
criticizing her for not doing.97 
V. CHANGES IN TITLE VII INTERPRETATION 
Title VII’s federal regulations do not properly describe how the 
disparate impact theory can be used to shield the protected classes from 
unintentional discrimination in the workplace.  In order to increase 
protections for survivors of domestic violence, I propose two changes.  
First, the regulations need to not only mention, but also describe, the 
disparate impact theory and how it can be used to protect survivors of 
domestic violence from workplace discrimination.  Second, cases in which 
a domestic violence survivor does not work with her abuser, but is fired or 
otherwise adversely treated for reasons that are attributable to the abuse, 
should be added as examples in the federal regulations.  It would be 
extremely influential for the EEOC to consider proposing a rule that would 
add the discriminatory effects standard or disparate impact theory to the 
regulations as well.  Specifically, it would make the most difference to 
domestic violence survivors and women as a class if guidelines were added 
to the sex discrimination section. 
Changes in the interpretation of Title VII would allow lawyers to 
understand how discrimination against domestic violence survivors can be 
argued under the disparate impact theory.  Clearer guidelines or regulations 
would also allow domestic violence survivors to file charges of 
discrimination with the EEOC (or at the local level, with the North Dakota 
Department of Labor) without the assistance of an attorney—a cost that 
many cannot afford.  As Selmi pointed out, it was the EEOC, and not the 
courts, that originally came up with the disparate impact theory as an 
alternative approach to cases of employment discrimination.98 
While it is true today that a woman in this situation could bring a 
charge of sex discrimination to the EEOC, without clarification in the 
regulations it would be unlikely for a favorable result to be achieved.  One 
 
96. Id. 
97. See Robin H. Thompson, Domestic Violence and Its Effects on the Workplace, in AM. 
BAR ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 364, 367 (2d ed. 
2004) (stating that maintaining steady employment is central to a victim’s security and ability to 
be independent from an abuser). 
98. Selmi, supra note 90, at 715. 
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factor that may deter women from filing claims of sex discrimination is a 
lack of understanding of the law.99  The same holds true for attorneys who 
represent these women.  This is not only because it is rarely used but also 
because it is undeveloped in case law.  Changing the regulations could also 
increase private rights of action on behalf of domestic violence victims who 
are discriminated against.  “By making explicit the ways in which domestic 
and sexual violence continue to be a site of sex discrimination, employment 
law can more effectively address impermissible discrimination, promote 
retention of valued employees, and help domestic and sexual violence 
survivors attain safety and economic security.”100  One of the best ways to 
make this explicit is through significant changes in the federal regulations 
interpreting sex discrimination under Title VII. 
VI. APPLICATION OF TITLE VII TO FEMALE EMPLOYEES WHO 
ARE SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Employment discrimination against survivors of domestic violence is 
not being addressed by the only applicable theory: disparate impact.  
Women, like Mary or Cindy, are terminated for reasons that are completely 
the fault of their abusive partner.  Title VII states employers cannot 
discriminate against someone on the basis of sex.101  Due to the proportion 
of women who are domestic violence survivors, when an employer fires her 
for missing work, for medical treatment, to attend court, or other domestic 
violence related issues, the employer is effectively firing her for being a 
victim.102  Disparate impact is the most applicable theory to seek recourse 
against the employer’s discriminatory acts but as it stands it is not being 
used.  The problem is that advocates, lawyers, and administrative agents 
either do not know how to apply the theory, or they do not know it is the 
appropriate legal tool in the first place—there needs to be more guidance 
regarding the disparate impact theory as an appropriate doctrine for 
addressing discrimination and regulations to clarify how to apply the 
disparate impact theory. 
 
99. Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work:  Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex 
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 84 (2008). 
100. Id. at 123.  
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  
102. Mary’s situation is one where there is no direct contact by the perpetrator with the 
employed survivor’s workplace, but the abuse she is experiencing at home detrimentally impacts 
her ability to attend work and maintain her work performance and she is fired. 
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A. DISPARATE IMPACT’S LACK OF INFLUENCE 
Despite the fact that the disparate impact theory would cover a breadth 
of discriminatory situations in the workplace, very few survivors use the 
doctrine in court or file charges of sex discrimination with the EEOC.103  
Women who do not work with their batterers, who are not harassed by their 
abusers in the workplace, or who do not work for an organization that 
practices overt discrimination against battered women, can only sue under 
the disparate impact theory.104  The low number of employment 
discrimination claims filed by domestic violence survivors may be 
attributable to factors such as a victim’s reluctance to self-identify, lack of 
understanding of employment rights, and her lawyer’s failure to recognize a 
domestic violence victim may have suffered employment discrimination 
based on her sex in the first place.105  In addition to these barriers, the 
evidentiary requirements for the disparate impact theory are still difficult to 
meet, even though proof of discriminatory intent is not required.106  “Even 
in the context of domestic violence, a plaintiff would still have to rely on 
statistics to demonstrate that . . . a facially neutral practice of terminating 
any employee injured in a domestic violence incident impacts more women 
than men.”107  These statistics are relatively easy to find but may be a 
reason why the theory is underused.  The above reasons also expose a crack 
in existing employment discrimination law where survivors of domestic 
violence may fall through. 
The disparate impact theory has the capacity to reach and protect many 
domestic violence survivors because it protects against common situations 
of implicit discrimination.  These situations include, but are not limited to, 
Mary’s situation, where she experiences domestic violence at work through 
the affects it has on her daily life and not because she is being assaulted at 
work.  When a facially neutral policy, such as firing a domestic violence 
survivor because of her status as a survivor, is upheld, so is discrimination 
against women. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF TITLE VII 
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to include “disparate impact” for 
the first time.108  The statute states an unlawful employment practice based 
 
103. Calaf, supra note 24, at 186. 
104. Id. 
105. Goldscheid, supra note 99, at 84. 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
107. Calaf, supra note 24, at 187. 
108. See Civil Rights Acts of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(k)(1)A) (2006)). 
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on disparate impact is established under this title in two circumstances.109  
First, the complaining party needs to demonstrate that the respondent used a 
particular employment practice that caused a disparate impact on the basis 
of their membership in a protected class.110  Alternatively, the complaining 
party could make a successful disparate impact claim by identifying an 
adequate, alternative employment practice and the employer refusing to 
adopt such a practice.111  Title VII itself is not the problem; rather, the 
interpretation of the disparate impact theory within Title VII is lacking. 
As previously mentioned, there are no North Dakota examples of the 
disparate impact theory being used in sex discrimination under the ND 
Human Rights Act, let alone one where it was applied to a situation in 
which a survivor of domestic violence was discriminated against.  Critics 
may argue this absence of case law is proof the theory is not needed; 
however, it is more likely because lawyers do not know how to identify and 
apply the disparate impact theory for their clients in the first place.  Again, 
this does not mean that the ND Human Rights Act is the problem.  Rather, 
the problem lies in the interpretation of the Act. 
With regard to the disparate impact theory, simply looking to the 
statutory text of Title VII will not always give you a clear answer.112  “The 
relevant analysis of Title VII’s disparate impact provisions would 
accordingly focus on the statutory language that creates liability for 
disparate impact . . . .  [L]iability for disparate impact in employment 
practices was engineered by the EEOC and the courts before it was ever 
clearly approved by Congress.”113  Title VII does not instruct how courts 
should apply the theory in sex discrimination.  In 2010, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Lewis v. City of Chicago,114 holding it was not the 
court’s job to assess various legal approaches and choose the best one.115  In 
his opinion, Justice Scalia stated: 
Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted.  By 
enacting § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i), Congress allowed claims to be 
 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
110. Id.  Protected classes include race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  The 
respondent must also fail to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity.  Id. (emphasis added). 
111. Id. 
112. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 493, 506 (2003). 
113. Id. 
114. 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
115. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. Lewis alleged the City’s practice of selecting only applicants 
who scored an eighty-nine or above on a written test for firefighters had a disparate impact on 
African American employees.  Id. 
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brought against an employer who uses a practice that causes 
disparate impact, whatever the employer’s motives and whether or 
not he has employed the same practice in the past. If that effect 
was unintended, it is a problem for Congress, not one that federal 
courts can fix.116 
The EEOC guidelines interpret the theories posed in Title VII that may 
be used in employment discrimination.  Although not binding, courts often 
look to the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the laws for 
direction.  The problem is if you look up “sex discrimination” in Chapter 
XIV of Title 29 of the regulations you will not see disparate impact or 
disparate treatment described there.117  As a matter of fact, the only theory 
of sex discrimination fully described in this section is sexual harassment.118  
Sexual harassment is only one of three ways a domestic violence survivor 
may bring an action of sex discrimination against her employer;119 
therefore, the regulations seem to fall short.  In fact, the regulations 
contained in Part 1604 describing sex discrimination do not describe 
disparate treatment or impact theories.  I propose that Part 1604 of the 
regulations should outline how each of these theories may be used in sex 
discrimination cases, and offer examples of each.120  Discrimination against 
domestic violence survivors in the workplace could be a featured example 
used to explain how survivors are being discriminated against and how it is 
in fact sex discrimination.  It follows that if these proposals were 
implemented at the federal level, North Dakota courts could look to them 
for guidance as well.121 
C. DISPARATE IMPACT IN HOUSING LAW: A COMPARISON 
Successful arguments under the disparate impact theory have been 
made in a housing context where domestic violence survivors find 
themselves adversely treated by landlords.122  For example, one domestic 
 
116. Id. 
117. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1691 (2012). 
118. Id. § 1604. 
119. Calaf, supra note 24, at 177. 
120. The EEOC fact sheet published on their website is a great place to start for examples of 
disparate treatment against domestic violence survivors that are recognized by the EEOC as forms 
of sex discrimination.  EEOC, supra note 10. 
121. See Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 255, 257 (N.D. 1993) (stating 
that the North Dakota Supreme Court looks to federal interpretations of Title VII where state case 
law is lacking).  
122. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement 
and Programs of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. to the Directors of the Office of Fair Hous. 
and Equal Opportunity (Feb. 9, 2011) (discussing Alvera v. Creekside Vill. Apts., No. 10-99-
0538-8; see also Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 675 (D. Vt. 2005).  See 
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violence survivor brought a claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) 
challenging her eviction under her landlord’s zero-violence policy using the 
disparate impact theory.123  An unlawful termination in the employment law 
context may be considered analogous to an unlawful eviction in housing.124  
For example, Tiffani Alvera favorably settled her case when her landlord 
wrongfully evicted her after obtaining a protection order against her abusive 
husband.125  For Tiffani, this was a discriminatory event that had a disparate 
impact on her sex.126  The same approach should apply in discriminatory 
decisions made in employment discrimination cases. 
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD)127 recently proposed regulations interpreting the FHA that would 
improve use of the disparate impact theory in housing law.128  The rule 
known as, “Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory 
Effects Standard” proposed on November 16, 2011, would establish 
uniform standards in determining discriminatory acts under the FHA.129 
Under this rule, liability is determined by a burden-shifting approach.  
The plaintiff or complainant must first bear the burden of proving its prima 
facie case of either disparate impact or perpetuation of segregation, after 
which the burden shifts to the defendant or respondent to prove that the 
challenged practice has a necessary and manifest relationship to one or 
more of the defendant’s or respondent’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests.130 
The interpretation of the FHA and Title VII are frequently compared to 
each other in the courts131 and the same burden-shifting approach is 
mentioned in the statutory text of Title VII.132  “HUD’s proposal is 
 
generally Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized:  Housing Discrimination Against Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2003). 
123. See Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 122, at 10. 
124. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 22-34, Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010). 
125. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 122, at 121. 
126. Id. 
127. HUD is the federal agency charged with enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act. 
128. At the time of this writing, the proposed rule was not in effect.  As of February 15, 
2013, the Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard became a 
final rule and took effect on March 18, 2013.  78 F.R. 11459, 24 C.F.R. 100, available at 
https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-03375 (last accessed April 26, 2013). 
129. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 70,921 (proposed Nov. 16 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
130. Id. at 70, 923-24. 
131. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935-41 
(2d Cir. 1988) (using Title VII precedent to analyze disparate treatment in a FHA case); id. at 935 
(citing cases that have noted the persuasive parallel between Title VII and Title VIII). 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
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consistent with the discriminatory effects standard confirmed by Congress 
in the 1991 amendments to Title VII.”133  The United States Supreme Court 
held Title VII reaches employment practices that have a discriminatory 
effect in cases such as Griggs,134 yet the regulations interpreting Title VII 
are not as clear as those proposed to further interpret discriminatory effects 
under the FHA.  The Court in Griggs also asserted “[t]he objective of 
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the 
statute.  It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees.”135  Griggs was a monumental case in 
employment discrimination law because it established use of the disparate 
impact theory. 
The intended place for the proposed rule in Title 24 of the regulations 
is Part 100, “Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act.”136  The 
function of this section is to describe prohibited conduct under the FHA.137  
It also serves as a guide, not unlike the function of Chapter XIV of Title 29 
as it relates to prohibited practices under Title VII.138  The proposed rule 
would add a subpart to 24 C.F.R. 100 that describes how liability might be 
established under the FHA using a discriminatory effect standard.139  This 
standard is essentially another way of describing the disparate impact 
theory.  The new section not only defines the standard, but it goes on to 
describe the necessary burdens that a complainant would have to meet.140  
In relevant part, the new section, 100.500 describes the discriminatory 
effect standard as follows: 
Liability may be established under this subpart based on a housing 
practice’s discriminatory effect, as defined in § 100.500(a), even if 
the housing practice is not motivated by a prohibited intent.  The 
housing practice may still be lawful if supported by a legally 
sufficient justification, as defined in § 100.500(b).  The burdens of 
proof for establishing a violation under this subpart are set forth in 
§ 100.500(c).141 
 
133. See id. § 2000-e-2(k). 
134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). 
135. Id. at 429-30. 
136. 24 C.F.R. pt. 100. 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
138. 29 C.F.R. ch. XIV. 
139. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 70,865, 70,926 (Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100), see also supra note 128. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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Furthermore, the rule defines discriminatory effect as a housing 
practice that: 
[A]ctually or predictably:  (1) [R]esults in a disparate impact on a 
group of persons on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin; or (2) [H]as the effect 
of creating, perpetuating, or increasing segregated housing patterns 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin.142 
The above description and definition of this theory will make a 
significant difference in assisting domestic violence survivors in bringing 
housing discrimination claims.143  I would anticipate the same important 
difference could be made in the employment law arena if the EEOC were to 
propose a similar rule amending the guidelines on sex discrimination. 
Critics of the discriminatory effect standard may argue the theory poses 
too much of a burden on landlords and will open the floodgates for 
discrimination claims against companies who are trying to maintain their 
businesses.  However, the proposed rule accounts for businesses that have a 
justifiable reason for the conduct in question.  As in Title VII cases, in 
claims of housing discrimination the burden shifts from the complainant or 
plaintiff to the respondent or defendant to prove they have a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory” interest in supporting the challenged practice.144  This 
means the landlord, or apartment management company, has a business 
necessity defense which may be used to prove the action was legitimate.  
Employers would also have a chance to prove the adverse employment 
action taken has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose in maintaining the 
business. 
VII. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES AND STRENGTHENING 
DISPARATE IMPACT 
The federal regulations do not sufficiently describe the disparate 
impact theory and how it can be used to shield the protected classes from 
unintentional discrimination in the workplace.  I have proposed changes 
that would clarify the interpretation of Title VII in a way that uses it as 
Congress intended: to protect against sex discrimination and thus protect 
survivors of domestic violence in the workplace as well.  First, the 
 
142. Id. 
143. See generally Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 22-34, Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010). 
144. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 70,924. 
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regulations interpreting Title VII need to not only mention, but also 
describe the disparate impact theory in a way similar to the rule proposed 
by HUD in interpreting the FHA.  This would clarify the standard for 
determining an employment act that has a discriminatory effect.  Housing 
and employment law have often been compared in discrimination cases,145 
and I see no reason why the standards used to interpret disparate impact 
under the FHA cannot be transferrable to Title VII.  Second, cases in which 
a domestic violence survivor does not work with her abuser, but is fired or 
otherwise adversely treated for reasons that are attributable to the abuse, 
should be added as examples in the regulations. 
The only theory of sex discrimination under Title VII currently 
described in the regulations that could be used to protect a survivor of 
domestic violence is sexual harassment, a narrow theory applicable only to 
instances where the survivor’s violent partner is a co-worker abusing her at 
the workplace.146  Employment decisions that have a disparate impact on 
domestic violence survivors also have a disparate impact on women as a 
class due to domestic violence predominantly impacting women.147  Claims 
brought under this theory should be analyzed as affecting women as a 
whole class, rather than a single survivor in her workplace.148  Analyzing 
claims this way would bring to light the importance of the disparate impact 
theory by showing the larger impact it can have on protecting women.  In 
order to achieve this goal, it would be beneficial to first add the disparate 
impact theory as an example of sex-based discrimination after section 
1604.11 on sexual harassment.  The section could be added as 1604.12 and 
be titled “discriminatory effect prohibited” or “proving sex discrimination 
under the disparate impact theory” and describe how a plaintiff may make a 
claim of discrimination under this standard.  Ideally, this new section would 
also include subsections of examples of workplace discrimination against 
domestic violence survivors. 
HUD has already done much of the work in their recent proposal for 
the FHA regulations that the EEOC would have to do in order to propose an 
additional rule in their Title VII regulations.  I anticipate that a proposal to 
expand the regulations for discrimination based on sex found in part 1604 
would look very similar to those proposed as “Subpart G” for the FHA 
 
145. See generally Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
935 (2d Cir. 1988). 
146. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
147. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 62. 
148. See id. (describing the importance of analyzing “single decision” cases under the 
disparate impact theory; this analysis is important but beyond the scope of this writing). 
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regulations.149  Specific examples of prohibited acts of discrimination to be 
analyzed under the disparate impact theory or “discriminatory effects 
standard” as it is described in HUD’s proposed rule should be added to the 
Title VII regulations.150  This could be incorporated through describing a 
scenario where an employment action taken against a domestic violence 
survivor would lead to a disparate impact on women as a class.  For 
example, if a domestic violence survivor is terminated after disclosing to 
her employer she is a survivor of violence and needs a day off to obtain a 
protection order, and she is subsequently fired for this request or for the 
employer’s stated fear of her bringing violence into the workplace, that 
would be a scenario that represents unlawful discrimination under Title VII 
using the disparate impact theory.  Essentially, these cases would include 
instances where a domestic violence survivor is terminated for a reason that 
is attributable to her status as a survivor and not to particular employment 
policies that would naturally be subject to disparate impact review.151 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In order to move toward ending violence against women, the 
discriminatory acts that doubly victimize survivors of domestic violence 
need to stop.  By wrongfully terminating a woman who is a domestic 
violence survivor, employers could be precluding her from fleeing her 
abuser.  The disparate impact theory is important in the protection of 
survivors and should not only be maintained, but also strengthened.  
Interpretation of Title VII should be clarified to include a breakdown of the 
disparate impact theory and explanation of the class-wide discrimination 
caused by discriminating against a survivor of domestic violence.  Adding 
the disparate impact theory to the guidelines on discrimination based on sex 
in the Code of Federal Regulations would ultimately work toward ending 
violence against women at both state and national levels, through protecting 
survivors from acts of discrimination in the workplace. 
 
149. As of this writing, the FHA regulations I have mentioned have not yet been enacted. 
150. See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,921. 
151. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 48. 
